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Abstract 
This paper reports the first empirical evidence that fiscal reform efforts in transition 
countries have positive effects. Using the EBRD BEEPS I and II data, reported in 1999 
and 2002, rigorous econometric models are estimated showing that the share of bribes 
paid to tax collectors is reduced in countries with more extensive fiscal reforms. This 
effect controls for selection bias in the likelihood that firms are required to make 
unofficial payments to tax authorities. On the basis of this evidence, we now have some 
confidence in the success of fiscal reform efforts. In addition, we have insight regarding 
what forms of fiscal reform may be more successful as the share of revenues generated 
from direct taxes (both personal and corporate) has an impact on tax bribes.  
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1 Introduction and Background 
 
Over the past fifteen years we have witnessed one of the largest economic experiments in 
history as many of the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have undergone fundamental economic transformations. Moving away from central 
planning to market reliance in the allocation of resources in both factor and product 
markets, these countries have experienced wrenching transition processes as they have 
struggled to establish the institutions necessary to support greater market reliance. This 
has required fundamental changes in the role and institutions of the public sector, 
including changes in the tax system. Fiscal reform projects, often aided by technical 
assistance provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the European Union (EU), have been carried on to varying degrees in most of the 
transition countries. These projects typically involve rewriting tax laws to make the tax 
systems more compatible with market economies, establishing modern treasury 
functions, and improving administration of the tax collection agency. With all of this 
effort, however, there is precious little hard empirical evidence that the fiscal reforms 
have made life easier for firms struggling to be successful in these transforming 
economies.  
While fiscal reform projects have been conducted in transition countries since the 
early 1990s, the assessment of specific impacts has been lacking. The purpose of the 
research reported in this paper is to begin an assessment of the specific impacts of fiscal 
reform in transition countries. Fiscal reform projects have heretofore lacked micro-level 
testing of whether project accomplishments have made life better for businesses 
operating in their country. Other things being equal, we would expect that reform of the 
public sector should assist firms in conducting business. 
Firm-level survey data collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank is now available that enables researchers to 
analyze the potential impacts on firms. The Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) was conducted in 1999 (BEEPS I) and repeated again in 
2002 (BEEPS II). The surveys included approximately 3,000 firms in 20 transition 
countries in 1999 and 6,000 firms in 27 countries in 2002. Table 1 provides a   2 
comprehensive list of the countries included in both surveys. This data has been useful to 
researchers who have analyzed the prevalence of corruption, the extent of state capture of 
firms during the transition process, and matters of governance. See, for example, 
Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman [13], and Helman, Jones, and Kaufmann 
[12].  
Hellman et al [13] analyzed the BEEPS I data on both the frequency of firms 
admitting to paying bribes and, conditional on that admission, the percentage of revenues 
paid in bribes. They report summary statistics for each country in the survey. The 
percentage of firms admitting to ever paying bribes spans the range from approximately 
45% in Slovenia and Belarus, to a high of approximately 90% in Kyrgyzstan, 85% in 
Azerbaijan, and 80% in both Romania and Uzbekistan. Firms admitting to ever paying 
bribes then reported the percentage of revenues typically paid in bribes ranging from a 
low of approximately 2% in Croatia and 3% in Poland and Estonia, to a high of 
approximately 8% in Georgia, 7% in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 6% in Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Tanzi and Tsibouris [25] were among the first to report BEEPS I data in analysis 
of transition countries. In their comprehensive review of fiscal reform over the first 
decade of activity in transition countries, they analyzed both the frequency and extent of 
the so-called bribe tax, or the required unofficial payments taxpayers made to tax 
officials. They reported the percentage of firms in each of the transition countries bribing 
frequently or more often, and also reported the average bribe tax as a percentage of 
annual firm revenues.  The percentage of firms bribing frequently or more often ranged 
from a low of 7.7 percent in Slovenia to a high of 59.3 percent in Azerbaijan. The 
average bribe tax as a percent of annual firm revenues ranged from a low of 2.1 percent 
in Croatia to a high of 8.1 percent in Georgia. 
Neither the Hellman et al nor the Tanzi and Tsibouris analysis go beyond the 
simple reporting of descriptive statistics on the frequency of bribe paying and the amount 
of bribes paid, however. Kaufmann et al [15] do not go beyond descriptive analysis 
either. In what follows, we will estimate simultaneously equations to explain both the 
frequency of bribe paying and the amount of bribes paid.   3 
Tanzi and Davoodi [26] also report analysis of BEEPS I data on bribes as they act 
as a regressive tax, with bribes paid (as a share of annual revenue) falling with the size of 
the enterprise. The original analysis of this data is from EBRD [8]. These and other initial 
uses of BEEPS I data are simple applications in which the survey data have been used to 
provide descriptions of the situations in transition countries. There has been very little 
analysis using the survey data to conduct rigorous statistical tests of refutable hypotheses. 
The BEEPS data also makes it possible to begin, for the first time, analyzing 
whether how the considerable fiscal reform efforts exerted in transition countries have 
affected the business environment. Using the considerable variation in fiscal reform 
projects and their progress across transition countries we can augment the BEEPS data 
with country-specific data on fiscal reform efforts. Benchmark events in each country’s 
fiscal reform can be used to approximately measure the advance of fiscal reform. For 
example, we can include variables that capture the presence of an accounting reform 
project, the presence of a fiscal reform project, the adoption of new budget rules, the 
establishment of local treasuries, the adoption of a destination-based valued added tax 
(VAT) or system of excise taxes, the adoption of a revised and comprehensive tax code, 
and other important fiscal reforms. 
 
2 Transition and Taxes 
 
Fiscal reform in transition countries has involved fundamental re-structuring of both the 
revenue and expenditure systems to facilitate the larger transition to market-oriented 
resource allocation in the economy. On the expenditure side, fiscal reform efforts have 
rationalized public sector responsibilities, introduced hard budgets and modern budgeting 
processes, and established treasury functions. On the revenue side, the focus of fiscal 
reform efforts has been on the development of a comprehensive tax code, the 
establishment of a destination-based consumption-type VAT, the implementation of a 
corporate income tax based on market-based net income, the widespread elimination of 
exemptions and preferences. For an overview of the typical fiscal reforms recommended 
and implemented in transition countries, see Lorie [17], Martinez-Vazquez and McNabb 
[19], [18], Summers and Baer [24], Stepanyan [23], and Tanzi and Zee [27].   4 
Mitra and Stern [20] have analyzed the transition experience of CIS and CSB 
countries (Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics) and compared their experiences to 
high-income OECD countries. They have identified opposing movements in key ratios 
often used to monitor fiscal reform. Both tax levels and the composition of tax revenue 
sources are considered in assessing progress in fiscal reform. Opposing effects arise, 
however, in two ways. First, there are opposing effects between the beginning of 
transition and the situation at the end of a decade of transition. Second, there are 
opposing effects in cross-section comparisons of transition countries after a decade of 
reform and highly developed industrial countries. For both reasons, Mitra and Stern 
suggest that there is a U-shaped temporal pattern of the share of tax revenues to GDP and 
the shares of major taxes in tax revenue. 
In the cross-section comparison of transition countries, there are several factors 
to consider. There is a loss of revenue from traditional profit, turnover, and payroll taxes 
due to the non-competitive nature of state enterprises. Price liberalization, new hard 
budget constraints, and private competition combine to reduce the potential revenue 
generated by taxing these entities. Furthermore, the complexity of fiscal reform has 
involved a limited ability to quickly implement a broad-based low-rate tax structure that 
is effectively administered. The challenge has been that of instituting a new tax system 
that fosters compliance among new and restructured enterprises, before they are driven 
underground. For both of these reasons it has been difficult for transition governments 
that formerly operated with a preemptive claim on the output of enterprises and 
the associated income generated and earned. Under the centralized systems before 
transition, the government exercised its claim to resources before citizens had access to 
the remainder. With transition and a less centralized system, however, the government 
has a diminished role and is forced to collect revenue in order to support spending. Mitra 
and Stern identify several implications of this transition situation, including a reduction in 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP (due to declining corporate income tax revenue), a 
reduction in the ratio of public expenditures to GDP (due to a macroeconomic need to 
reduce fiscal deficits to control inflation), a reduction in the importance of income taxes 
(due to the reduced corporate income tax revenue), a reduction in the importance of 
social insurance tax revenues in CIS countries, an increase in the share of individual   5 
income taxes, and an increase in the importance of indirect taxes such as VAT and 
excises taxes (reflecting the decline in direct taxes). With fiscal reform we expect a rise in 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, an increase in the share of direct taxes in tax revenue, an 
increase in the share of revenue from personal income taxes, a reduction in the share of 
revenue from domestic forms of indirect taxation, and a reduction in the role of trade 
taxes.  
Tanzi and Tsibouris [25] discuss the expectation that progress in fiscal reform 
should result in improved revenue performance. They caution, however, that many of the 
reforms were recently implemented and have not yet been fully felt. Some reforms are 
revenue-reducing (such as the elimination of export taxes and excess wage taxes). 
Furthermore, many tax policy reforms have been hindered by problems in tax 
administration. Concern over tax evasion has been a particularly vexing issue in many 
transition countries. In one study of tax evasion Anderson and Carasciuc [2] examined 
evidence from the Republic of Moldova and found quite predictable effects, with greater 
measured tax evasion in sectors of the economy where audit frequencies were lower 
and/or where the real value of fines and penalties were lower. 
 
2.1 Reform Measures 
2.1.1 Subjective Measures of Fiscal Reform 
 
A number of analysts engaged in assessing the extent of fiscal reform during the first 
decade of transition. Consequently, we have available several indices of the extent of 
reforms. We may use these indices as measures of the breadth and depth of reforms in an 
attempt to determine whether reforms have had an impact on the business environment in 
which firms operate. Two sources of reform measurement are considered in what follows. 
  First, we use the subjective reform measures computed by Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab [18]. They created two reform measures: a cumulative reform index (CRI) and an 
overall reform index (ORI). Their CRI measure is constructed using data from twenty-
four transition countries over the period 1989-96.  
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They use six measures of the effectiveness of reform, including:  
 
• Timing of tax reform—the period of time from the start of the transitional process of the 
implementation of a tax reform program that included a modern VAT. 
• Preparation for tax reform—the average period of time allocated for preparation of 
legislation and preparation for implementation. 
• Stability of the tax system—frequency of changes in the tax laws since the initial reform 
program. 
• High tax rates—positive deviation of the maximum rates for the primary revenue 
sources from the average maximum rate for the primary revenue sources of all countries 
in transition. 
• Prevalence of tax holidays—significance of tax holidays and special treatments. 
• Complexity—number of enterprise profit tax brackets.  
 
  Using the scores from all six of these measures, Martinez-Vazquez and Mc- 
Nab construct a cumulative reform index CRI by summing each country’s six scores. CRI 
scores range from a low of 3 to a high of 17, with a mean of 11.75. A low score indicates 
more advanced reform. The most advanced reform countries include Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Croatia. High intermediate reform countries include Slovak 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Kazakhstan, and Slovenia. Low intermediate 
reform countries include Bulgaria, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Albania, 
Romania, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. Slow reform countries include Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Belarus. Then, they construct an overall 
reform index ORI by assigning an index value from zero to 3 for countries in each of 
these groups. Here again, the lower the index score, the more advanced the reform. 
Second, we use the subjective reform measure reported by Ebrill and Havrylyshyn 
[4] who conducted a study of fiscal reforms in CIS and Baltic countries for the IMF. 
Their TPR index of tax policy reform over the period 1992-98 measured the degree of 
policy reform using a scale from one, indicating very little appropriate market-oriented 
reform, to a score of 5, indicating a high degree of reform.   7 
These three indices of tax policy reform are used in the models described below in 
order to assess whether the degree of fiscal reform has had a measurable impact. In 
addition, we use objective measures of the extent of reform, as described in the next 
section. 
 
2.1.2 Objective Measures of Fiscal Reform 
 
In addition to the subjective measures of fiscal reform described above, we use objective 
measures of reform in order to gain as broad a perspective as possible on the effects of 
reforms. 
The primary objective measure of fiscal reform we use is the share of tax revenue 
generated by direct taxes, including personal and corporate income taxes. As explained in 
section two, this key ratio is an indicator of the extent of fiscal reform. In the initial 
stages of reform the ratio is relatively low as countries rely heavily on excises, customs 
duties and other forms of indirect taxation. As reform proceeds, however, the ratio rises. 
Hence, we use the share of revenues derived from direct taxes as an objective measure of 
tax reform. The direct tax measure used in the BEEPS I analysis is taken from Mitra and 
Stern [20], Table 2 reporting taxes on income, profits, and capital gains during the early 
years of transition as a percent of tax revenue. In the 2002 BEEPS II analysis use the 
Mitra and Stern Table 4 (average for 1999 and 2000) reported share of direct taxes as a 
percent of tax revenue.  
A secondary objective measure of fiscal reform is a micro-level indicator. We use 
a dichotomous variable indicating that the firm uses international accounting standards as 
a measure of fiscal reform. This may be an indicator that there has been a successful 
accounting reform project in the country. Or, it may indicate that the firm is a subsidiary 
of a foreign-owned firm. In either case, we anticipate that is measure will also reveal 
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3 Methodology 
 
The research reported in this paper is based on analysis of BEEPS data augmented with 
country-specific information, including data on fiscal reform projects and their 
accomplishments. We conduct rigorous econometric analysis of firmlevel data on 
responses to survey questions related to the public sector and its effects on the business 
environment. The typical survey question provides a vector y of firm responses to a 
question and the survey instrument provides a matrix x of observations of firm 
characteristics. In particular, we are interested in the size of the unofficial payments, or 
tax bribes, that firms are required to make and whether fiscal reform efforts affect these 
tax bribes. We will augment the survey data with country-specific economic data, 
described in a matrix z, and country-specific information on fiscal reform efforts, 
described in a matrix r. Hence, analysis of the tax bribe might involve estimation of a 
model explaining y, such as, 
y = β0x + γ0z + δ0r + ε,                                                                            (1) 
where the coefficient vectors β, γ, and δ are estimated. Estimates of the coefficients in the 
vector  δ have the potential to inform analysis of the effects of fiscal reforms across 
transition countries. A simple regression of this type is unlikely to be very informative, 
however. The problem is that there is likely to be substantial selection bias. We only 
observe tax bribe information for those firms that report having to make such bribes. 
Those firms may be systematically different from other firms in the survey sample. 
Hence, we need to account for the likelihood that firms are asked to pay tax bribes as we 
also model the amount they report paying. 
We have survey questions asking firms both the likelihood that the firm is asked 
to pay a bribe and the proportion of bribes the firm must pay that is associated with taxes. 
Consequently, we can estimate a two-equation system in which we control for sample 
selection and jointly estimate the likelihood of being asked to pay a bribe and the size of 
bribes paid to avoid taxes. In such a case, we will estimate standard sample selection 
models using either two-stage least squares or maximum likelihood methods. Another 
example arises from the fact that we have sufficient survey information to model the   9 
interaction of bribery and taxation. Firms were asked in the BEEPS survey how 
frequently they are faced with demands for bribes. They were also asked what percent of 
revenues they typically paid per year in unofficial payments to public officials. 
Furthermore, they were asked how much they paid in bribes across nine specific 
services, including: connection to public services, licenses, taxes, government contracts, 
customs, courts, health or fire inspections, influence legislation, and other services. Using 
this data, we can estimate a model that jointly explains the likelihood of being asked to 
pay bribes and the amount of bribes paid (focusing specifically on those bribes that are 
tax-related). Hence, we can gain accurate information on both the prevalence of bribe-
taking by tax officials and the extent of bribe-taking, conditional on its prevalence. This 
type of model permits more insightful analysis of the effects of fiscal reform efforts than 
has been possible with aggregate data in the past. Analysis based on aggregate data does 
not permit estimation of careful distinctions between prevalence and extent. Using firm-
level data and appropriate econometric methods, such distinctions can be made. 
We will begin with the simplest selection model with a selection criterion. A 
model of firm behavior or experience y (in this application, being required to make 
unofficial payments to the tax authorities) is explained by a set of explanatory variables 
in the matrices x, z, and r. This model applies to all firms, but the observed data (on the 
level of bribes paid or the share of bribes paid to avoid taxes) are not drawn randomly 
from this population. Rather, we observe the firm and its data when another variable z∗ 
crosses a specified threshold. If we were to treat the observed data as a random sample, 
instead of coming from the sub-population with particular properties, our estimation 
would be subject to serious bias. Instead, we use an auxiliary equation to model the 
selection process that generates z∗. The combined equations and the error term 
assumptions are given as: 
y = β0x + γ0z + δ0r + ε                                                                 (2) 
z∗ = ψ0v + u 
ε, u ∼ N [0, 0, σ2ε, σ2u, ρ] 
where σε, σu are the standard errors of the error terms and ρ is the correlation of the error 
terms, ε and u, in the two equations. The problem is that z∗ is not directly observed, but a   10
variable z is observed with the property that z = 1 if z∗ > 0 and z = 0 if z∗ ≤ 0. Values of 
y and x in the first equation are observed only when z = 1. 
If we simply estimated a model using least squares regression for the observed tax 
bribe data following the specification for y in equation (2) we would obtain inconsistent 
estimates of the parameter vectors β, γ, and δ. Ignoring z and r for the moment, we know 
that the expected value of y is given as,  
E[y | y is observed] = E[y | z∗ > 0] = β0x + βλλ(αu),                                          (3) 
where 
αu = −ψ0ν / σu,                                                                                                     (4) 
λ(αu) =  φ(ψ0ν/σu) / Φ(ψ0ν/σu) 
 
Hence, a simple ordinary least squares regression of tax bribes y on a vector of 
explanatory variables x would have an omitted variable and our estimate of the β 
coefficient vector would be inconsistent as it lacks the second term in equation (3). If we 
compute the term λ(αu),the so-called inverse Mills ratio, and include it in the regression, 
we can obtain a consistent estimate of β. In the estimation results presented below, we 
use this two-step Heckman procedure and first estimate a probit model, z∗ = ψ0v +u, of 
firms being asked to pay tax bribes, then use that equation to estimate the selection 
equation for the amount of tax bribes reported, conditional on the firm being asked to pay 
tax bribes.  
Another related research question that we do not address is the prevalence of 
paying taxes in in-kind or non-monetary means. This includes tax offsets and netting 
operations performed by the Ministry of Finance. See Anderson [1], Commander and 
Mumssen [3], Ickes and Ryterman [14], and Ledeneva [16] for discussions of this issue 
and the related issue of inter-firm arrears in transition economies. Since the BEEPS 
survey data includes firm responses to a specific question on the extent to which taxes are 
paid in such ways we could estimate a model that provides insight on the country 
conditions and government policies that make this practice more or less prevalent. This 
would permit the first firm-level analysis of these practices and the changing reliance on 
these practices by governments over time, but we leave this for future research. 
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4 Empirical Results 
 
This study will provide the first rigorous statistical analysis of the impacts of fiscal 
reform efforts on the business environment in transition countries. By using firm-level 
micro data at two points in time, 1999 and 2002, we will be able to assess how fiscal 
reform projects and their accomplishments may be affecting the business environment in 
which individual firms are operating and experiencing the effects (or lack thereof) of 
reforms. Keeping in mind that the 1999 survey asked questions about conditions three 
years prior, we have a window on what firms experienced over the period from 1996 to 
2003. With the combined variation across countries and over time we anticipate being 
able to identify some specific effects of fiscal reform efforts, as business firms have 
perceived them. 
Such results will advance our knowledge of the nature and manifestations of 
corruption, as described in Schleifer and Vishny [21] and of the way politicians and firms 
behave, as described in Schleifer and Vishny [22]. Secondly, these results will inform our 
assessment of the so-called virtual economy that is prevalent in transition economies, as 
described in Gaddy and Ickes [9], [10], [11], Ericson and Ickes [7], and Ericson [6], [5]. 
Finally, these results will inform policy assessment of fiscal reform in transition 
economies, as in Tanzi and Tsibouris [25]. 
Consequently, we anticipate having the first direct evidence with which to assess 
the success or failure of the various fiscal reform efforts that have been attempted across 
a broad range of transition countries. To date, assessment of fiscal reform programs has 
been severely limited by a paucity of data related to their impacts. We anticipate that this 
study will be the first to rigorously provide insight on these important programs and their 
likely effects. 
 
4.1 BEEPS I (1999) Model Estimates 
 
We begin our analysis with a simple examination of the likelihood that firms says they 
are asked to make unofficial payments to tax officials. The initial pobit equation 
estimated uses three variants of firm answers to question 28 as the dependent variable:   12
Q28 yes indicates that firms responded affirmatively regardless of the frequency, Q28 
always indicates firms responded that they always need to make unofficial payments, and 
Q28 never indicates that firms responded never having to make unofficial payments. 
Table 3 reports probit estimation of an initial model explaining the likelihood that firms 
are asked to make unofficial payments for tax purposes. Independent variables included 
in the model control for the level of economic activity in the country (GDP per capita), 
the rate of economic growth in the country (GDP growth rate), the importance of 
agriculture in the economy (agricultural value-added as a share of GDP), location in the 
CIS, firm use of international accounting standards, firm size measured by full-time and 
part-time employees, firm use of the internet, and direct taxes as a share of total tax 
revenue. The first column reports estimation of the Q28 yes model. Firms were more 
likely to report being asked to make unofficial payments for tax purposes in countries 
with lower GDP per capita, since the GDP per capita variable has a negative and 
significant estimated coefficient. Firms with larger full-time employment were also less 
likely to be asked to make unofficial payments, although those with larger part-time 
employment were more likely to be asked to pay bribes. Firms with access to the internet 
were less likely to be asked for bribes. Finally, the larger the share of tax revenue derived 
from direct taxes in the country where the firm is located, the less likely the firm is to be 
asked to pay bribes. Note that the probit estimation for the Q28 never model has identical 
estimated coefficients, with the exception of the sign, and identical standard errors. This 
is due to the fact that the Q28 never variable is simply one minus the Q28 yes variable. 
The center column of results in Table 3 reports an estimation of a probit model 
explaining the likelihood that firms report always having to pay tax bribes. The GDP per 
capita variable is negative and significant indicating that in countries with higher GDP 
per capita firms are less likely to always be asked to pay tax bribes. The agricultural 
value-added variable is negative and marginally significant, indicating weak evidence 
that firms are less likely to be asked to always pay tax bribes in more heavily agricultural 
economies. The only other significant variable in the model is the full-time employment 
variable, which has a negative estimated coefficient. Firms with larger employment are 
less likely to always be asked to pay tax bribes. 
While these probit models explaining the likelihood of firm responses regarding   13
tax bribes are insightful, they are not fully revealing of the important issues we wish to 
examine. We want to model both the likelihood of firms having to pay tax bribes and the 
size of the bribes paid. We also want to examine whether the extent of fiscal reform has a 
significant impact on tax bribes. To accomplish that purpose we must estimate a selection 
model. The selection probit equation uses the dependent dichotomous variable that firms 
report affirmatively on BEEPS I question 28. Independent variables in the probit 
selection model explain the likelihood that firms are asked to make unofficial payments. 
Hence, the independent variables measure the level of economic activity in the country 
and include GDP per capita, the GDP growth rate, agricultural value-added, a 
dichotomous variable for CIS countries, and the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. These 
variables are used to control for the overall level of economic activity and the state of the 
fiscal system in the country and their effects on the level of tax corruption. 
Table 4 reports both the selection Probit regression model and the corrected tax 
bribe regression models using three different subjective measures of the extent of fiscal 
reform, the Martinez-Vazquez and McNab ORI and CRI measures and the Ebrill and 
Havrylyshyn TPR measure. All three of these models use a common probit estimation for 
the likelihood of firms being required to pay tax bribes. Then, in the second stage of the 
estimation procedure we estimate the corrected regression for the amount of tax bribes 
(as a percent of total annual bribes paid for all purposes), including the sample selection 
correction (inverse Mills ratio). 
The estimated Probit model includes explanatory variables intended to control for 
the level of economic development (and correspondingly the extent of transition) and the 
rate of economic growth across the countries in the BEEPS I sample. All five variables 
and the constant term are significant, permitting us to reject the null hypotheses that the 
variables have no effect on the likelihood of being required to pay tax bribes. The first 
variable is the GDP per capita (measured in PPP terms). The estimated negative 
coefficient on this variable indicates that the higher GDP per capita, the less likely a firm 
in that country is to be required to pay tax bribes. The second variable in the model is the 
growth rate of GDP in the country. This variable has a positive estimated coefficient, 
indicating that a firm in a fast-growing country is more likely to be asked to pay a tax 
bribe. In addition to controls for the level of economic development and the growth rate,   14
the model includes three variables that capture other important conditions that affect the 
likelihood of firms being required to pay tax bribes. The agricultural value-added variable 
is included to distinguish between countries that are highly reliant on agricultural 
production and those that are less agricultural in their economic output. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable is positive, indicating that firms in more agricultural countries 
are more likely to be required to make unofficial payments to tax authorities. A 
dichotomous variable for countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of 
the former Soviet Union is also included, since their tax administration systems may be 
systematically different from those of countries outside the CIS.  The estimated negative 
coefficient on this variable indicates that firms in CIS countries are less likely to be 
required to pay tax bribes, other things being equal. Finally, the Probit model includes a 
variable to control for the level of taxation across countries, the ratio of tax revenue to 
GDP. The estimated coefficient on this variable is negative, indicating that the higher the 
level of taxation, the lower the probability that a firm will have to pay tax bribes, other 
things being equal.  
The second stage of the estimation process is to take the results of the Probit 
model and use those results to estimate the inverse Mills ratio (λ) and include it in the tax 
bribe equation to correct for sample selection bias. We estimate three variants of the 
corrected tax bribe equation, including three alternative measures of fiscal reform. In all 
three corrected regressions the fiscal reform measure is a significant determinant of the 
amount of tax bribes paid. The CRI and ORI measures both have estimated coefficients 
that are positive. Recalling that these reform measures are inversely related to the extent 
of reform, the positive coefficients indicate that tax bribes are smaller in countries with 
more extensive fiscal reform. The TPR measure of fiscal reform is directly related to the 
extent of reform, hence the negative estimated coefficient on that variable in Model 3 
also indicates that tax bribes are smaller in countries with more extensive reform. All 
three subjective measures of fiscal reform are significant determinants of the tax bribes 
paid by firms in transition countries. 
Table 5 provides estimates of the final selection model that includes both 
subjective and objective measures of fiscal reform, in two variants. Both 2SLS and 
maximum likelihood estimates are reported. The table reports the selection probit model   15
estimation in the upper panel and the corrected regression for the selected regime in the 
lower panel. The lower panel of the table provides model estimates for the corrected 
regression. Controlling for the likelihood of the firms being asked to make unofficial 
payments to tax officials, this equation explains the share of firms’ gross receipts paid in 
unofficial tax payments. The first set of variables included in the model control for firm 
characteristics, including the number of both full time and casual employees, trade 
relationships with the state sector, and the use of the internet in the business. The full 
time employment size variable has a positive estimated coefficient in both estimates 
indicating that the larger the employment level of the firm the larger the share of gross 
receipts it pays in tax bribes. The number of casual employees has a negative, but not 
statistically significant effect on tax bribes. Trading with the state has the effect of 
lowering the unofficial tax payments made by firms. Use of the internet increases the size 
of unofficial tax payments, but the effect is not statistically discernible. 
Fiscal reform measures included in the model include both subjective and 
objective measures of reform. An accounting reform variable is used to capture whether 
firms are using international accounting standards (Question 43 from the BEEPS I 
survey). This measure is included as an objective measure of firm-level reform. The 
estimated coefficient on this variable is negative in the 2SLS model, but positive in the 
MLE model. In neither case is the accounting standard variable statistically discernible, 
however. Apparently, the mere fact that the firm uses international accounting standards 
has no effect on the size of bribes paid. The model also includes a variable measuring the 
share of direct taxes (personal and corporate income taxes) relative to total taxes. This is 
another objective measure of fiscal reform. We expect that as fiscal reform advances 
direct forms of taxation (personal and corporate income taxes) replace indirect forms of 
taxation (excises, customs duties, and VAT). The estimated coefficient estimate on the 
direct tax share variable is negative and highly significant in both model estimations, 
indicating that the larger the share of direct taxes in the country the lower the share of 
firms’ gross receipts paid in unofficial tax payments. As fiscal reform generates a greater 
share of tax revenue from direct taxes we see that the size of tax bribes is reduced. 
Finally, we include a subjective measure of reform using the Martinez-Vazquez and   16
McNab CRI reform measure (measuring cumulative reform in the country). The 
estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and significant in both estimated models. 
Recalling that the CRI index value is inversely related to the extent of reform, this 
estimated coefficient indicates that countries with more advanced reforms pay smaller 
amounts in tax bribes. Hence, we have evidence that the extent of fiscal reform, as 
measured by this subjective index of reform, has an impact on tax bribes paid by firms, 
after controlling for the likelihood that the firm is required to make such payments. 
The estimated coefficient for λ, the inverse Mills ratio in the two-step model, is 
negative and highly significant, reflecting the presence of sample selection bias. Hence, 
we are justified in estimating a selection model rather than a simple regression explaining 
tax bribes. Without the inverse Mills ratio in the tax bribe model we would be 
overestimating the size of tax bribes. Controlling for the fact that we only observe tax 
bribes for firms reporting them, we obtain smaller estimated bribes. The estimated 
parameters σ and ρ in the MLE model reflect the standard error of the error term in the 
first equation and the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, 
respectively. 
 
4.2 BEEPS II (2002) Model Estimates 
 
We analyzed firm responses to the BEEPS II survey question 56, which asked, "Thinking 
now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in a given year, could 
you please tell me how often they make payments/gifts for the following purposes." One 
purpose listed was, "To deal with taxes and tax collection." Firms responses were coded 
according to the following scale: Never (1), Seldom (2), Sometimes (3), Frequently (4), 
Usually (5), Always (6), and Don’t know (7). Table 6 reports estimates of Probit models 
of firm responses to this question. Three dichotomous variables were created to capture 
firm  responses. The Q56yes variable takes on the value one if the firm responded seldom 
or more frequent, and the value zero otherwise. The Q56always variable takes on the 
value one if the firm responded always, and the value zero otherwise. Finally, the 
Q56never variable takes on the value one if the firm responded never, and the value zero 
otherwise.   17
Comparing the results reported in Table 6 it is clear that the level of GDP per 
capita has a significant effect, with higher GDP per capita reducing the likelihood that a 
firm reports paying tax bribes (Q56yes), reducing the likelihood that the firm always pays 
tax bribes (Q56always), and increasing the likelihood that the firm reports never paying 
tax bribes (Q55never). The growth rate of GDP has a negative effect on Q56yes and a 
positive effect on Q56never, although it has no discernible effect on Q56always. 
Apparently, the GDP growth rate is less important than the level of GDP in the economy. 
Agricultural value-added does not have a statistically discernible effect on firm 
responses. Firms in CIS countries, however, report different responses from firms in 
other countries. They are more likely to report paying tax bribes, more likely to report 
always paying tax bribes, and less likely to report never paying tax bribes. Firms using 
international accounting standards or using the internet in their business appear to face no 
different situation than other firms. Firm size clearly has an important impact on firm 
responses. The measure of firm size merely categorizes firms as small (2-49 full-time 
employees), medium (50-249 full time employees), or large (250 or more full-time 
employees). The firm size variable takes on the value one for small firms, two for 
medium size firms, and three for large firms. Considering the estimates for the firm size 
variable across the three models in Table 5 it is clear that larger firms are less likely to be 
asked to pay tax bribes and more likely to never pay tax bribes, other things being equal. 
Finally, we included an objective measure of fiscal reform with the direct taxes variable. 
The effect of a higher proportion of direct taxes in the country’s fiscal structure is to 
reduce the likelihood that firms report paying tax bribes, reduce the likelihood that they 
report always paying tax bribes, and increase the likelihood that they report never paying 
tax bribes.  
A selection model was also estimated using the BEEPS II data. In the first stage, 
we used firm responses to question 54, which asked if it is common for firms to make 
irregular "additional payments/gifts to get things done" with regard to taxes and other 
services. Firm responses were coded according to the scale described above, taking on 
values from one to seven. The next question, Question 55, then asked, "On average, what 
percent of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts   18
to public officials?" The estimation strategy is to use firm responses to Question 54 in the 
first stage Probit equation, with the dependent variable taking on the value one if the firm 
responds that it pays tax bribes seldom or more frequently. The second stage equation 
then explains the percent of annual sales paid in bribes, conditional on the firm reporting 
that it pays bribes. Table 6 reports both two-stage and maximum likelihood estimates of 
the selection model. 
Considering the first-stage Probit model in the two-stage least squares estimation, 
it is apparent that the likelihood of reporting tax bribe payment is negatively related to 
GDP per capita the GDP growth rate, but positively related to location in the CIS and 
also positively related to the tax revenue to GDP ratio. Results are similar in the 
maximum likelihood model, although the tax revenue to GDP ratio is not significant in 
that model. The selection model estimates from the MLE estimation are quite similar to 
those of the 2SLS estimation. Firm size is negatively related to bribe size and 
international accounting is positively related to bribe size. In this case, the direct tax 
variable does not have a statistically discernible effect on tax bribes.  
 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
After nearly fifteen years of transition experience and extensive efforts at fiscal reform to 
support economic transition, there is precious little evidence on whether fiscal reform 
efforts have been successful. Given the difficult experience of many transition 
economies, including some where fiscal reforms have been prominent, it is not readily 
apparent that fiscal reform has been a success. To date, the measures of fiscal reform 
project success have been crude and inadequate, however. Counting the number of laws 
changed or the number of tax officials sent to seminars, as is often done in reporting 
protocols on fiscal reform projects for example, provides no reliable insight into whether 
those efforts have made it easier for firms to engage in market activities and support the 
transition to a market economy. The research reported in this paper is the first to use the 
extensive firm-level survey data collected by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to test the effects of varying degrees of fiscal reforms 
across transition countries. Using the BEEPS I and BEEPS II data sets, augmented with   19
both subjective and objective measures of fiscal reform, we test whether reforms have an 
impact on the likelihood that firms are asked to pay tax bribes and if so, whether reforms 
affect the size of those bribes. 
Our empirical evidence based on the BEEPS I survey data indicates that fiscal 
reforms have been effective in reducing the amount of tax bribes paid by firms. 
Controlling for the country-specific factors that affect the likelihood that firms are 
required to make unofficial payments to tax officials, we find that the unofficial tax 
payments reported by firms accounts for a smaller share of total annual unofficial 
payments made by firms where fiscal reforms have been more extensive. In this way, we 
have the first solid evidence that fiscal reforms have produced practical and important 
effects at the firm level in transition countries. Our evidence based on the BEEPS II 
survey data also indicates that the share of tax revenues derived from direct taxes, both 
personal and corporate, reduces the likelihood of firms being required to pay tax bribes. 
While we do not have newer subjective indices of fiscal reform to include in the selection 
models estimated using the BEEPS II data, the evidence is that direct taxes have an 
impact on the likelihood of firms being required to pay tax bribes, if not on the amount of 
tax bribes paid. 
One of the limitations present in this study is that the survey questions related 
to tax bribes and firm characteristics were changed between BEEPS I and BEEPS II. The 
inconsistent availability of firm characteristics and measures of tax bribes makes direct 
comparison between our estimates impossible. Nevertheless, the data provide important 
insight regarding tax bribes. Of course, the fact that firms pay less in tax bribes in 
countries where fiscal reforms have been more extensive does not mean that the firms 
pay less in overall bribes. Further research is needed to consider whether the reduction in 
tax bribes is accompanied by a change in other types of bribes and unofficial payments. It 
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Table 1: Transition Countries Represented in the BEEPS I and II Surveys 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 3: BEEPS I Probit Estimation for Question 28 on Tax Bribes 
 
 
a,b,c,d indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% levels or less. 
Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 4: Two-Stage Estimates of BEEPS I Tax Bribe Selection Models 





a,b,c,d indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% levels or less. 
Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 5: Estimates of BEEPS I Selection Models 
 
 
a,b,c,d indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% levels or less. 
Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 6: BEEPS II Probit Estimation for Question 56 on Tax Bribes 
 
 
a,b,c,d indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% levels or less. 
Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 7: Estimates of BEEPS II Selection Models 
 
 
a,b,c,d indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% levels or less. 
Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
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